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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the 2002 elections, Republicans in Texas and
Colorado achieved unified control of their state governments.1 In both
states, Republicans introduced congressional redistricting legislation
and enacted a new redistricting map. Just a year earlier, following the
release of the decennial census, each state had enacted a congressional
redistricting map that had governed the 2002 elections. The second
round of legislation marked the first time in United States history
that a state reopened redistricting for partisan political purposes after
1. "Unified government" refers to control of both houses of the legislature as well as
control of the governor's office.
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a redistricting plan had been adopted following the release of the
decennial census, had been upheld as constitutional, and had been
used in an intervening election. Democrats in both states filed
lawsuits, alleging not only that Article I of the Constitution forbids a
state from engaging in redistricting after the state already has used a
valid map in an election following release of the census but also that
the mid-decade redistricting plans were unconstitutional partisan
gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2
Part II of this Note will use Texas as a case study to provide
insight into the redistricting process. Part III will examine the
differing conclusions of the Colorado and Texas courts on the
constitutionality of mid-decade redistricting. This Note will then
address two challenges to this unprecedented use of mid-decade
congressional redistricting. Part IV of this Note will address whether
a state legislature has the authority under Article I of the
Constitution to redraw a lawfully-enacted congressional redistricting
plan after it has been used in one or more elections but before the next
decennial census. Since this is a question of first impression, 3 this
Note will analyze the issue according to the text of the Constitution,
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution, and analogous
redistricting precedents. Part V will address whether mid-decade
redistricting qualifies as an intentional partisan gerrymander in
2. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456-57 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (alleging that "[p]lan
1374C is invalid because (1) Texas may not redistrict mid-decade; (2) the Plan unconstitutionally
discriminates on the basis of race; (3) the Plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; and
(4) various districts in Plan 1374C dilute the voting strength of minorities in violation of § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act"); People ex rel Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Colo. 2003)
(challenging state legislature's redistricting plan on the basis that the state constitution "limits
the timeframe and frequency within which the General Assembly may ... [redraw district lines]"
and arguing that the legislature acted outside of this timeframe). The lawsuits also alleged that
the redistricting plans violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but that point is beyond the
scope of this Note.
On October 18, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the Texas congressional
redistricting case to the three-judge panel from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas for further consideration in light of the 2004 Supreme Court ruling in Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267 (2004) (partisan gerrymandering case from Pennsylvania). If the redistricting plan
is declared unconstitutional, then the winners of the 2004 elections will find themselves running
in different congressional districts in 2006, and the defeated incumbents from 2004 will have a
decent chance at winning back their old seats. See http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/pdf/101804
remand.pdf.
3. See Edward Walsh, Redrawing Districts Raises Questions, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2003, at
A4 (stating that "[a]ccording to experts in the field, there is no precedent in modern U.S. politics
for what the Texas and Colorado Republicans did: voluntarily redraw congressional district lines




violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Note ultimately concludes that states have the
plenary power to conduct mid-decade redistricting, subject only to the
supervisory power of Congress. Finally, in Part VI, this Note proposes
that, because of vital public policy considerations, Congress exercise
its supervisory power to prohibit redistricting until the release of the
next decennial census after a lawfully enacted map has already been
used in an election.
II. TEXAS: A CASE STUDY IN REOPENING REDISTRICTING
The Texas Constitution provides that the legislature "shall, at
its first regular session after the publication of each United States
decennial census, apportion the state into senatorial and
representative districts."4 Although the Texas Constitution does not
explicitly address federal congressional districts, the legislature's
consistent practice has been to handle federal congressional
redistricting as it does state redistricting. 5 In Texas' seventy-seventh
legislature's regular session, which ran through May 2001, the
legislature could not reach an agreement on a new congressional plan,
and Governor Rick Perry opted not to call a special session to complete
a redistricting map.6 This failure to act required the courts to produce
a redistricting map consistent with constitutional guidelines.
On November 14, 2001, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas, based both on findings that the thirty
existing congressional districts in Texas were unconstitutional and on
the "continuing failure of the State to produce a congressional
redistricting plan," imposed a new map of thirty-two congressional
districts. 7 The court entered a final judgment declaring that the
existing congressional districts were unconstitutionally
malapportioned and adopted plan 1151C as the remedial
congressional redistricting plan for the state."
Neither the state nor any other defendant appealed the court's
decision to impose its own redistricting map. 9 Instead, the state of
Texas filed a motion asking the United States Supreme Court to enter
4. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
5. Motion to Prohibit Modification or Termination of Injunction at 3, Balderas v. Texas,
6:01-CV-158 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Motion to Prohibit].
6. Id.
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 4.
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an order affirming the judicially created redistricting map. 10 On June
17, 2002, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed." As a result, the
district court's plan remained in place and governed the 2002
elections.
Although Plan 1151C created several potentially competitive
congressional districts, recent statewide elections suggested that
twenty districts leaned at least somewhat Republican and twelve
districts leaned at least somewhat Democratic.' 2 However, the 2002
elections resulted in a congressional delegation with fifteen
Republicans and seventeen Democrats. 13 "The two new congressional
districts that Texas gained from reapportionment elected Republicans,
while the other thirty districts reelected twehty-eight incumbents and
elected one freshman from each party (each of whom replaced a
retiring member of the same party)."'14
"Seven of the incumbents-six Democrats and one Republican
-prevailed even as their districts were voting for senatorial,
gubernatorial, and other statewide candidates of the opposite party.""
These seven incumbent members of Congress won because they
attracted split-ticket voters. Without that support, each would have
lost to a challenger from the dominant political party in the district. 6
Not surprisingly, those seven incumbents had the closest contests of
any incumbents in the State, and three of them won with less than
fifty-two percent of the total vote.' 7 "Because six of the seven
incumbents who won these relatively tight contests were Democrats,
Democrats won more of the State's thirty-two congressional seats, and
Republicans won fewer seats than the current statewide balance of
power alone would have suggested."'8
The election resulted in a net gain of two seats for Republicans,
with additional gains at the state-legislative level.' 9 "As a result,
Republicans won a majority of seats in the Texas House of
10. Id.
11. Balderas v. Texas, 536 U.S. 919, 919 (2002).
12. Motion to Prohibit at 4, Balderas (6:01-CV-158).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (emphasis in original).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4-5. The statewide balance of power is measured here by political party
registration numbers. In this instance the statewide balance of power was not reflected in the
congressional elections because Democrats won a majority of the seats, despite the fact that a
majority of the state's population and many of the state's congressional districts were moderately
to heavily Republican.
19. Id. at 5.
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Representatives, and with it, unified control of the state government
for the first time since reconstruction. 2 °
The newly elected seventy-eighth legislature convened in
regular session in 2003.21 The entire state government was now
controlled by Republicans, who could exercise complete control over
the redistricting process. The Texas House of Representatives
immediately began considering congressional redistricting, and its
Redistricting Committee quickly passed a plan and sent it to the full
House for consideration.2 2 There was no precedent for the Texas
legislature's push for mid-decade congressional redistricting, which
was driven by Texas Congressman and Majority Leader Tom DeLay.
23
During a press conference in Austin, Texas, Congressman DeLay
stated that the rationale for the mid-decade redistricting effort was:
"I'm the Majority Leader, and we want more seats."24 "During the
2003 regular session, as a critical deadline approached for passing
legislation in the Texas House, a group of Democratic House members
fled the state and broke a quorum for a week, setting off a frenzied
reaction."25
Governor Perry and the Speaker of the Texas House of
Representatives Tom Craddick asked state law-enforcement officials
to physically compel the Democrats to return so that a quorum could
be issued. 26 Republican efforts to locate the Democrats were
expansive. For example, Texas Department of Public Safety troopers
were sent to a neo-natal unit to try to nab one legislator who might be
visiting his premature, newborn twins.27 Congressman DeLay's office
also attempted to enlist federal assistance from the Department of




23. Id. While the United States House of Representatives in no way controls redistricting
decisions in the state legislatures, Congressman DeLay's enormous influence in Texas politics,
both federal and state, prompted members of the Texas House to support his plan.
24. Id. (citing Suzanne Gamboa, DeLay, Texas Dems in Redistricting Fight, ASSOCIATED
PRESS ONLINE, May 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 20007924).
25. Id. In order to take up a piece of legislation, the legislature must establish a quorum. A
quorum occurs when two-thirds of the legislative body is present. By fleeing the state,
Democratic lawmakers created a large enough absence to prevent two-thirds of the House from
being present. As a result, Texas Republicans, despite being in the majority, could not begin
work on the redistricting legislation until enough Democrats returned to surpass the two-thirds
barrier. Id. at 5-6.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Id. at 5-6 (citing April Castro, Troopers Sent to Find Lawmakers Who Skipped Session,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 13, 2003).
200x] 1939
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Department of Justice to locate and apprehend the Democrats.28 None
of these tactics succeeded in finding the legislators and regaining a
quorum.29 "Consequently, the legislative deadline passed without
action by the Texas House, effectively killing the congressional
redistricting measure for the regular session."
30
During the 2003 regular session, Representative Joe Crabb, the
Chair of the House Committee on Redistricting, asked Texas Attorney
General Greg Abbott if the Texas Legislature had a mandated
responsibility to perform congressional redistricting in 2003.
3'
Attorney General Abbott issued his opinion on April 23, 2003, stating
that the "Legislature was not mandated to act nor could it be
compelled to do so."32 Attorney General Abbott also stated that the
plan drawn by the three-judge court in the Balderas litigation was a
valid map that could govern congressional elections for the entire
decade.
33
Shortly after the 2003 regular session ended, Governor Perry
announced that he was calling the Texas legislature into special
session to take up congressional redistricting. 34 "This marked the first
time in history that the Texas legislature would be convened for the
purpose of enacting a new congressional plan to replace a legally valid
map."35
During the first special session, the House quickly passed a
new congressional map despite widespread public opposition. 36 "The
28. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE SEARCH FOR ABSENT TEXAS
LEGISLATORS 4-6 (2003) (discussing the Justice Department's role in attempting to locate the
Texas legislators), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special]0308a/final.pdf; Federal Aviation
Administration Efforts to Locate Aircraft N711RD Before the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector
General, U.S. Dept. of Transportation) (discussing the Department's role in attempting to locate
the Texas legislators), available at http://www.oig.dot.gov/show-pdf.php?id=1127; OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION IN03-OIG-
LA-0662-S 1 (discussing the Department of Homeland Security's involvement in attempting to
locate the Texas legislators), available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/DHSOIG_
InvestigationTexas.pdf.




33. See id. (stating that "[u]nless and until the Legislature adopts [a new] plan, the map
drawn in 2002 [sic] by the three-judge court in Balderas v. Texas will continue to be the
congressional redistricting plan for Texas.") (citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0063, at 5 (Apr.
23, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinopen/opinions/op50abbott/ga-0063.htm).
34. Motion To Prohibit at 6-7, Balderas (6:01-CV-158).




Senate Jurisprudence Committee also took up congressional
redistricting in the first special session. On July 23, 2003, the Senate
Committee voted along party lines to approve a new plan, with all
three Democrats voting against the measure, and all four Republicans
voting in favor.
'37
In the full Texas Senate, however, "the attempt to enact a new
congressional map failed in the first special session when eleven state
senators (more than a third of the Texas Senate) announced that they
were opposed to taking up congressional redistricting legislation."38 "It
has been a long-standing tradition of the Texas Senate to require that
a measure receive support of a two-thirds supermajority before the full
Senate will consider it."39 With only one exception, the Texas Senate
has used this practice, known as the "two-thirds rule," each time it has
convened in the last thirty years to enact a new congressional
redistricting plan. 40 Because more than a third of the senators
announced that they would not consider congressional redistricting
legislation, the measure died in the first special session.41
Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst then announced that he
would abandon the two-thirds rule in any future special session on
congressional redistricting. 42 Dewhurst noted that the decision to
abandon the two-thirds rule would apply only to congressional
redistricting legislation considered in any second special session.43
"When information surfaced that the Texas Senate would adjourn sine
die on June 29, 2003, and would convene a second special session five
minutes later, eleven Texas senators left the State to deny the Senate
of a quorum."44 Relations between Democrats and Republicans became
increasingly bitter, with Democrats refusing to return to the state
until the special session had ended, and Republican Senators voting to
fine their Democratic colleagues $5000 per day and to revoke
privileges for their staff.45 The eleven senators stayed out of the State
for a month, but as the second special session ended, one of the absent
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 7-8. This rule does not require that two-thirds of the Senate support the measure,
only that two-thirds of the Senate are willing to vote on the issue. For discussion of the "two-
thirds" rule, see Legislative Reference Library of Texas, The two-thirds rule, available at
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/citizenResources/twoThirds.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Ken Herman, Dewhurst: Redistricting Dead This Session, AUSTIN-AMERICAN






senators announced that he would return. 46 "The remaining ten,
unable to prevent a quorum, announced that they too would return."
47
Governor Perry called a third special session on September 9,
2003.48 This time, Democrats could not prevent a quorum, and on
October 12, 2003, the Legislature enacted a new congressional map
(Plan 1374C) on a near perfect party-line vote. 49 The sole purpose of
the plan was to defeat as many Democratic incumbents as possible.
50
When the 2004 election returns were in, it was clear that the
mid-decade redistricting plan had been a huge success. Before the
mid-decade redistricting map was enacted Democrats had held a 17 to
15 seat advantage in the state congressional delegation. 51 But the
morning after the election, Republicans awoke to discover that they
now commanded a 21-11 majority - a whopping 6 seat gain.5
2
III. THE MID-DECADE REDISTRICTING STATE SPLIT: TEXAS AND
COLORADO
The only two courts that have dealt with the issue of mid-
decade redistricting have reached seemingly irreconcilable
conclusions. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas held that the United States Constitution does not bar the use
of mid-decade redistricting.53 The Colorado Supreme Court, however,
held that the state's constitution forbade the use of mid-decade
redistricting.54 While the Colorado Supreme Court's holding was
based on state law, the reasoning and dicta of the opinion strongly
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id.
50. Suzanne Gamboa, DeLay, Texas Dems in Redistricting Fight, ASSOCIATED PRESS
ONLINE, May 7, 2003, available at 2003 WL 20007924).
51. Republicans Take Four of Five Targeted Democratic Seats, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 3,
2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/vote2004/2004-11-02-tx-
ushouse.redistricting x.htm.
52. See id. Prior to the election, in an act of self-preservation Democratic Representative
Ralph Hall switched parties, evening the split to 16-16. Democratic Representative Jim Turner
chose to retire, essentially giving Republicans a 17-15 advantage because his district had become
so heavily Republican that it was considered unwinnable by any Democrat. Five Democratic
incumbents fought until election day in their new, heavily Republican Districts. Democratic
incumbents Martin Frost, Charlie Stenholm, Max Sandlin and Nick Lampson were all defeated,
each by more than 10 percent. Only Representative Chet Edwards prevailed, with 51 percent of
the vote. Ironically, Congressman Edwards represents President Bush's congressional district in
Crawford, Id.
53. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458-59 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
54. People ex rel Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1226 (Colo. 2003)
1942 [Vol. 57:5:1935
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suggest that even if there were not a redistricting provision in the
Colorado Constitution, the court would find that the United States
Constitution prohibits mid-decade redistricting.
55
In addition, it is disputed that state law should even govern
this situation.56  Consequently, the Texas and Colorado opinions
effectively create a split among states, even though they are based on
different sources of law. The decision made by the Colorado Supreme
Court is one that likely could be used by another court, even one that
relies on federal law, to determine that the United States Constitution
forbids mid-decade redistricting. A federal court also could adopt the
reasoning employed by the Colorado Supreme Court to rule against
the use of mid-decade redistricting, thus placing it in direct conflict
with the decision of the district court in Texas. Despite the Colorado
Supreme Court's emphasis on state law, therefore, its decision is
squarely at odds with the result based on federal law in Texas. This
section of the Note will detail the Texas and Colorado court opinions.
A. Texas
In Session v. Perry, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas held that neither the United States
Constitution nor the Texas Constitution bars the use of mid-decade
redistricting. 57 While the case touched on racial discrimination,
partisan gerrymandering, and vote dilution claims, this Note will only
address whether Texas had the legislative authority to engage in mid-
decade redistricting.
First, the court noted that the Elections Clause of the United
States Constitution delegates to the states the power to determine the
procedures governing congressional elections in each state. The
Elections Clause provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chasing Senators."
58
55. See id. at 1245 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's acknowledgement of
the importance of federal law "is a telltale indication of the premise that court authority does
truly stem from federal law" and is not an independent creation of the state constitution).
56. See id. at 1249 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (taking issue "with the majority's assignment of
this issue to state law.").
57. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1.
200x] 1943
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The purpose of this provision is to give state legislatures the
authority to redraw congressional districts. 59 The court noted that
while states can enact the "time, places, and manner" of voting
regulations, the text of the clause does not further define or otherwise
limit the discretion of state legislatures. 60 Congress can override state
election decisions by enacting regulations of its own, but "unless and
until Congress chooses to act, the states' power to redistrict remains
unlimited by constitutional text. '61 Consequently, the court refused to
read the Elections Clause so as to allow the states to use their election
power only a single time after each census. 62
Second, the court relied on Supreme Court precedent
suggesting that states may redistrict mid-decade following court
action. The most direct Supreme Court assessment of redistricting
came in Wise v. Lipscomb, in which the Court stated:
Legislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to the federal courts;
but when those legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state
election makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the "unwelcome obligation" of
the federal court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending later legislative
action.
6 3
The Session court concluded that this language "contemplates
that any federal court plan must give way to later legislative
redistricting efforts. ' 64 Consequently, given the text of the Elections
Clause and Supreme Court precedent interpreting it, the Elections
Clause "does not limit states to redistricting once per decade,
particularly where, as here, the State's action follows a court-imposed
map."65
Third, the court dismissed the Census Clause as a limitation on
a legislature's ability to conduct mid-decade redistricting. The Census
Clause provides:
Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several
States ... according to their respective Numbers. . ,. The actual
59. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932) ("The phrase 'such regulations' plainly
refers to regulations of the same general character that the legislature of the State is authorized
to prescribe with respect to congressional elections. In exercising this power, the Congress may
supplement these state regulations or may substitute its own. It may impose additional penalties
for the violation of the state laws or provide independent sanctions. It 'has a general supervisory
power over the whole subject.' ") (citing Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387 (U.S. 1880)).
60. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 460.
63. 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (emphasis added) (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415
(1977)).




Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting
of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.
66
The court did not accept the plaintiffs' argument that the
requirement of enumeration every ten years imposed a limitation on
the states' power to redistrict. The Court based this on the difference
between apportionment among the states and apportionment within
the states, saying that the Census Clause applies only to the
apportionment of congressional seats among the states.67 While Clause
links each state's delegation to the state's population in order to
ensure a state is not over- or under- represented in the United States
House of Representatives, the Clause says nothing about how
congressional district lines within a state must be drawn.68 After the
census is released, congressional seats are reapportioned and states
are required to redistrict in order to bring their districts into
conformity with the equal protection rule of one man, one vote. 69
However, the Clause does not expressly limit the ability of a state to
redistrict more frequently. In fact, the Census Clause does not even
mention the states or their power to redistrict. 70 As a result, the court
concluded the Clause could not limit a power that was never
referenced, and it refused to add an implicit limitation to the Elections
Clause that states may determine the "times, places, and manner" of
holding elections only after each decennial census. 71
Fourth, the court dismissed the argument that Congress has
already exercised its power under the Elections Clause to limit the
authority of the states to conduct mid-decade redistricting. 72 There are
two provisions in Title 2 of the United States Code that arguably
represent an exercise of Congress's power to limit the authority of the
states to redistrict. 73 Section 2a specifies that the President must
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
67. Session, F. Supp. 2d at 462. Apportionment of Representatives among the states is the
process whereby congressional seats are allocated to the states based on population following the
completion of the United States Census. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: APPORTIONMENT OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata
/apportionment/history.html. Apportionment of Representatives within the states occurs after
the allocation of congressional seats to each state, when each state's legislature redraws the
congressional district lines within its borders. Id.
68. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 463.
72. Id. at 463-67.
73. Id. at 463.
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inform Congress after each decennial census of the population of each
state and the corresponding number of representatives apportioned to
each state, 74 and Section 2c requires every state entitled to more than
one representative under the census figures to create a number of
districts equivalent to the number of representatives it sends to the
House. 75 Plaintiffs argued that in Section 2c, Congress revoked the
power granted to state legislatures by the Elections Clause and
delegated a far more limited power and that Section 2c allows
redistricting only once after the decennial census.7 6 Consequently,
when the Balderas Court imposed a redistricting plan, the
redistricting power delegated to states through Section 2c was
effectively depleted, thus invalidating the new redistricting map
because the State had no authority to enact it. 77
The court held that while Section 2c is a restriction on the
states' ability to redistrict, it is not a revocation of the states' power.78
First, the court noted that had Congress wished to revoke the states'
redistricting authority, it should have done so clearly.7 9 More
importantly, the court stated that the structure of the Elections
Clause suggests that the primary source for election regulation is
state law, and that federal law can supplement or override state
procedures only when necessary.8 0 The court viewed Section 2c as a
congressional regulation imposing a single election requirement on the
states, thus preserving the role of Congress and the states under the
Elections Clause.81 The court proceeded to note that even if Section 2c
did revoke redistricting authority, Section 2c would not limit
74. 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2003). The pertinent part of section 2a reads:
On the first day, or within one week thereafter, of... each fifth Congress thereafter,
the President shall transmit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number
of persons in each State ... as ascertained under ... each subsequent decennial
census of the population, and the number of Representatives to which each State
would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing number of
Representatives by the method known as the method of equal proportions, no State to
receive less than one member.
75. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2003). The pertinent part of section 2c reads:
In each State entitled ... to more than one Representative under an apportionment
made pursuant to the provisions of [section 2a(a) of this title], there shall be
established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to
which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be elected only from
districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative.
76. Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
77. Id. at 464-65.
78. Id. at 464.
79. Id.




redistricting to only after the census.8 2 While Section 2c undoubtedly
imposes upon states an obligation to redistrict after each census, there
is nothing in the statute that limits the frequency with which a state
may do so.
8 3
Finally, the court held that redistricting custom and tradition
in Texas do not prevent the Texas Legislature from redrawing district
lines in the middle of the decade.8 4 Plaintiffs pointed to White v.
Weiser, in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts must
abide by state redistricting traditions when they are responsible for
map-drawing.8 5 The White Court also stated that "legislatures, not
courts, have 'primary jurisdiction' over reapportionment, and
reinforced the notion that court intervention in the redistricting
process is meant to be minor and remedial."8 6 The court declined to
extend this principle to the legislature, thus preserving its ability to
take the unprecedented step of mid-decade redistricting after a valid
map already had been used in an intervening election.
B. Colorado
Colorado's redistricting experience was similar to that of Texas.
After the state gained an additional House seat following the 2000
census, its General Assembly convened to work out a new redistricting
plan.8 7 The Colorado Legislature could not agree on a plan during its
regular session and two special sessions, so the matter went to the
courts.88 The district court settled on a map but gave the legislature
one more chance to pass its own plan during the 2002 session before
the court plan would be enacted.8 9 After the General Assembly again
82. See id. (stating that "even if § 2c did somehow revoke and redelegate redistricting
authority, we disagree that § 2c would allow redistricting only on the decennium.")
83. See id. (concluding that "[wihile it is true that states are under an obligation to
redistrict after each census, we find nothing in § 2c that limits the frequency with which they
may do so. It would have been remarkably easy for Congress to impose such a limitation in the
text of § 2c, but it did not.").
84. See id. at 466-467 (noting that "the Court has never held that a state legislature is
bound to follow its prior districting practices indefinitely," and declaring it "illogical to require a
state legislature to adhere strictly to the state's districting principles whenever it undertook to
redraw the state's map." (emphasis in original)).
85. 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973).
86. Id.
87. People ex rel Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Colo. 2003).




was unable to act, the court's redistricting plan was enacted for the
2002 election. 90
One year later, at the end of the 2003 regular session, the
newly elected General Assembly enacted a new redistricting plan. 91
The Colorado Attorney General filed an action in state court seeking
an injunction to prevent the Secretary of State from implementing the
new plan and a writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary of State to
return to the original 2002 redistricting plan.
92
The Colorado Supreme Court held that while the General
Assembly has the primary responsibility for drawing congressional
districts, when it fails to create a constitutional redistricting plan in
the face of an upcoming election and forces courts to create one, the
judicially-created districts are just as binding and permanent as
districts created by the General Assembly.93 The court held that
"regardless of the method by which the districts are created, the state
constitution prohibits redrawing the districts until after the next
decennial census."
94
While the Colorado Supreme Court based its holding on the
state constitution, federal law played a significant part in its decision.
First, the court noted that the United States Constitution does not
grant redistricting power to the state legislatures exclusively, but
rather to the states generally. 95 Second, the court noted that far from
being unfettered, the redistricting authority of the states is
circumscribed by federal law, especially by the requirement that "each
state must draw congressional districts immediately after each federal
census and before the ensuing general election."96 In addition, the
court wrote that under federal law, the Colorado Constitution cannot
relax the federal laws pertaining to redistricting; a state constitution
can only impose more stringent restrictions.
97
The court noted that while the United States Constitution
granted the states the power to draw congressional districts, that




93. Id. at 1231.
94. Id.
95. Id. The grant of power to the states generally allows for redistricting plans to be crafted
constitutionally by the judiciary, which would not be permissible if the power were granted
exclusively to the legislature.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1232.
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established the "one person, one vote" doctrine, which requires states
to elect all of their representatives from districts of equal
proportions.99 As a consequence of this doctrine, states now have a
"constitutional obligation to draw congressional districts with equal
numbers of constituents, or else justify any differences, no matter how
small, with a legitimate reason."100 The census figures are used to
comply with this doctrine, and new decennial census figures render
the old districts unconstitutional, forcing states to redistrict prior to a
subsequent election. 10 1 "In sum, under federal constitutional law, each
state must draw new congressional districts after a decennial census
or risk having its districts declared unconstitutional prior to the next
congressional election."'
102
The court also pointed to federal statutory limitations on
redistricting. First, the Court looked to Section 2c, which eliminated
the option of at-large elections for states with more than one
representative.10 3 Because of this provision, states are required to
draw same-sized, single-member districts. 10 4 Second, the court pointed
to the Voting Rights Act. 0 5 The Voting Rights Act forbids diluting the
voting strength of a minority group "sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district."'0 6 Furthermore, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires
preclearance, which mandates jurisdictions with a history of
discrimination to obtain federal approval before making any changes
to voting laws or procedures. 0 7 So, under federal law, far from having
unfettered authority to create congressional districts, states must
redistrict after each federal census before the ensuing election; create
single-member, racially-neutral districts; and obtain federal
preclearance for the redistricting plan if the state has a history of
discrimination.10 8




103. Id. at 1234. At-large elections differ from single-member districts in that under an at-
large election scheme, all members of Congress could be elected from the same part of the state.
Id. Instead of drawing a district and requiring one congressman per district, no districts are
drawn in at-large elections, and the people with the highest vote totals are elected regardless of
what region of the state they come from. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id., 79 P.3d at 1233 (finding that "[a]nother limitation on the General Assembly's
freedom to redistrict is the Voting Rights Act.").
106. Id. at 1234 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1234-1235.
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The United States Constitution and federal statutes restrict
the states' authority to redistrict, and a state constitution can only
further restrict a state legislature's authority to draw congressional
districts-it cannot expand it. 109 Unlike the Texas Constitution, which
is silent on redistricting and therefore only subjects the legislature to
federal redistricting limitations, Colorado's Constitution has a clause
addressing redistricting. Article V, Section 44 states:
The General Assembly shall divide the state into as many congressional districts as
there are representatives in congress apportioned to this state by the congress of the
United States for the election of one representative to congress from each district. When
a new apportionment shall be made by congress, the General Assembly shall divide the
state into congressional districts accordingly.1 1 0
Notwithstanding the court's analysis of federal redistricting
law, the court held that since there was a clause in the state
constitution dealing with redistricting, its holding would be based
entirely upon state law.11 ' The court determined that the crucial
language, "when a new apportionment shall be made by Congress, the
General Assembly shall divide the state into congressional districts
accordingly," did not permit redistricting to occur more than once per
decade.112
First, the court held that the plain meaning of this provision
did not contemplate mid-decade redistricting. The court stated that
the word "when" meant that redistricting could only occur after
apportionment. 113 The state must redistrict "any and every time" a
new apportionment occurs, and it must take place "just after" a new
apportionment." 4  "Conversely, redistricting may not happen
spontaneously or at the inducement of some other unspecified event; it
must happen after and only after a new apportionment."
115
Second, the court looked to history and custom in redistricting.
Never before had Colorado drawn congressional districts more than
once per decade. 116 In addition, the court emphasized that political
control of the State had flipped several times, and "[i]f the General
Assembly ha[d] always understood the state constitution to allow
109. Id. at 1235.
110. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44 (emphasis added).
111. See People ex rel Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (Colo. 2003) (stating that the
court's decision is based upon the Colorado Constitution and that federal law is discussed to "put
state law in context.").
112. Id. at 1235.
113. Id. at 1238.
114. Id.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 1239.
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redistricting more than once per decade, there should be some
evidence that it exercised that power." 117 Furthermore, the court noted
that this "tradition" is also found in many other states that have
changed party control of their state government mid-decade. 11
C. Colorado Dissent
Although the majority in Salazar asserted that its decision was
based purely upon state law, Justice Kourlis' dissent forcefully argued
that redistricting authority truly stems from federal law and is not an
independent creation of a state constitution. 1 9 Justice Kourlis argued
that even if the issue were one of state law, the plain meaning of the
Colorado Constitution's redistricting provision does not allow for a
time limit and thus allows for mid-decade redistricting. 1
20
Justice Kourlis objected to the use of state law because,
although the Supreme Court has given the states broad discretion to
define the process of redistricting, courts become involved only
because they need to enforce federal constitutional rights.
121
Consequently, any court order protecting those rights must be
governed by an application of federal, as well as state, law.122 Unless
the state constitution provides for a clear limiting factor on
redistricting, the United States Constitution should be viewed as the
ultimate arbiter on redistricting rights.
The dissent also argued that even if the case should be decided
under state law, the Colorado Constitution "neither assigns a specific
function in redistricting to the courts, nor a specific time within which
to complete that role."'123 Constitutional provisions should be given
their plain and ordinary meaning, and Colorado's constitutional
redistricting provision plainly has no requirement that redistricting
may only occur once per decade. 124 The majority relied upon the word
"when," which it viewed as establishing a clear timeframe that expires
after the decennial census is completed and before the first election. 125
117. Id. at 1240.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1249 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
122. See id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (stating that "the duration of a court order protecting
those rights, or the jurisdiction of a court to review existing districts when constitutional
infirmities exist, must be governed by an intermixed application of state and federal law.").
123. Id. at 1249 (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1238. (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kourlis wrote that while the redistricting provision can be
read to impose a duty upon the legislature to act as soon as possible
after the census is released, "it does not in any way imply the
imposition of a back-end limitation upon that duty."126 To read into the
redistricting provision an implied intention that the right to redistrict
is abrogated if not exercised within a narrow time frame is a long leap
to make. 1
27
In conclusion, while Session is based on the federal
Constitution and Salazar is ostensibly based upon state law, the
holdings of the two cases are largely incompatible. First, for the
reasons expressed in the Salazar dissent, it is not clear that a state's
constitution should govern mid-decade redistricting. Second, states
that do not have constitutional provisions relating to redistricting
may base their decisions on the United States Constitution, as did the
Texas District Court in Session v. Perry.128 Finally, of the states that
do have constitutional provisions relating to redistricting, only a very
limited number have constitutional provisions that clearly preclude
mid-decade redistricting. 129 The majority of state constitutional
provisions are similar to Colorado's provision, which is highly
ambiguous and does not make clear whether there is a back-end
limitation that prevents redistricting from occurring after a certain
date. 130 Consequently, while the Session and Salazar courts seem to
be based on different sources of law, it is possible to compare the two
opinions, and the differences between them seem to be irreconcilable.
The ambiguity of the Colorado Constitution, and similar constitutional
provisions of other states, ultimately leads to an analysis that leans
heavily upon federal law found in the United States Constitution. As a
result, Congress, the courts, or both, will have to resolve this
discrepancy, irrespective of the different language used in state
constitutions.
126. Id. at 1250. (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting). The dissent further noted that several states have read
their constitutional provisions on redistricting to implicitly allow for mid-decade redistricting. In
State v. Weatherill, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted its constitutional provision
referring to the "first session after each (census)" as a duty to reapportion in the first session but
not a prohibition on reapportionment at a later time. 147 N.W. 105, 106 (Minn. 1914). See also
Harris v. Shanahan, 387 P.2d 771, 795 (Kan. 1963) (holding that "the duty to properly apportion
legislative districts is a continuing one"); Selzer v. Synhorst, 113 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Iowa 1962)
(holding that the legislature's duty to reapportion continues until performed); Lamson v. Sec'y of
the Commonwealth, 168 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Mass. 1960) (same).
128. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458-59 (E.D. Tex. 2004).




IV. ARTICLE I ANALYSIS: STATES HAVE THE PLENARY POWER TO
CONDUCT MID-DECADE REDISTRICTING, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE
SUPERVISORY POWER OF CONGRESS
After completion of the 2000 census, the Texas and Colorado
legislatures had a constitutional duty to draw new congressional
district maps. When the legislatures could not do so, courts fulfilled
the states' constitutional duty to produce a map, and these lawfully
enacted maps were used in the 2002 elections. It is undisputed that
after using the court-ordered maps in the 2002 elections, the states
had satisfied their constitutional duty to redraw congressional lines.
This Note seeks to answer, however, whether the intervening election
not only ended the state's duty to redistrict, but also ended its ability
to once again change congressional districts before the next decennial
census. In answering this question, it is crucial to keep in mind that
there is a fundamental difference between the apportionment of
representatives among the states and the apportionment and election
of representatives within the states. 31 An examination of the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitution's Framers, and Supreme
Court precedent show that absent congressional action, Article I of the
United States Constitution does not forbid a state from engaging in
mid-decade redistricting.
A. Constitutional Text
The plain meaning of the Elections Clause of the United States
Constitution does not allow for a temporal limitation on
redistricting. 132 The Elections Clause is a grant of power to the states
that allows them to enact the "time, places, and manner" of voting
regulations.13 3 Other than the supervisory power granted to Congress,
there is absolutely nothing in the text of the Clause that can be
interpreted to limit the ability of a state to decide when and how
frequently it chooses to redistrict. The Constitution only requires
redistricting to occur after each decennial census is completed, and is
silent on whether states can redistrict more often.1 34  Since the
Constitution is silent on this matter, each state can choose to
131. See supra note 67.
132. The Elections Clause states in pertinent part: "The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,





redistrict during whatever "times" it chooses. While Congress can
override state election decisions by enacting regulations of its own,
unless it does so there is no limitation in the Elections Clause that
prohibits states from using their election power repeatedly after each
census.
The text of the Census Clause also fails to provide a limitation
on a state's ability to engage in mid-decade redistricting. 135 Any
argument that reads the requirement of redistricting every ten years
as a limitation on a state's ability to redistrict is severely misguided.
The entire purpose of the Census Clause is to set a requirement
regarding apportionment among the states-which requires that
population changes be taken into account and the number of
congressional seats granted to each state be reassigned to reflect its
change in population. 13 6 The Clause lacks even a single requirement
explaining how a state is to create districts within its own borders. Not
only does the Clause not expressly limit the ability of a state to
redistrict repeatedly after every census but also it does not even
mention the states or their power to redistrict within their own
borders. 137 Since the Clause never even references the ability of states
to reapportion within their own borders, it is impossible to read into
the Clause an implicit limitation that states may only change district
boundaries a single time following the completion of the decennial
census.
B. Framers 'Intent
The plain meaning of the Elections and Census Clauses are
reinforced by the debates at the Constitutional Convention, the state
ratifying conventions, and the Federalist Papers, which show that the
Framers never intended these constitutional clauses to limit a state's
ability to determine redistricting procedures within its own borders.
It was not until 1962 that redistricting disputes became a
justiciable cause of action under the United States Constitution.
Baker v. Carr considered an allegation that Tennessee's state senate
and representative districts were so disparate in the number of
qualified voters that the plaintiffs and persons similarly situated were
135. The Census Clause states in pertinent part: "Representatives ... shall be apportioned
among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers.... .. The actual
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the
United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by
Law direct." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
136. See generally Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 24 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 33-34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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"by virtue of the debasement of their votes," denied equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 138 After
reviewing the Court's long history of avoiding involvement in
reapportionment controversies, the Court held that federal courts had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the plaintiffs had
established a justiciable cause of action on which relief could be
granted. 139 This decision firmly established the federal judiciary as a
player in redistricting debates.
The most extensive discussion given by the Supreme Court on
the Framers' view of reapportionment comes from Wesberry v.
Sanders. 40 Wesberry, while not directly on point, is the most
illuminating Supreme Court decision on whether a state legislature
has the authority under Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution to
redraw a lawfully enacted congressional redistricting plan after it has
been used in an election. In Wesberry, plaintiffs resided in a Georgia
congressional district with a population almost three times as great as
any other district in the state. 4 1 Since there is only one congressman
per district, the plaintiffs contended that the inequality of population
meant that their congressman had to represent almost three times as
many constituents as other Georgia congressmen, thus leading to a
debasement of their votes. 142 The majority held that "construed in its
historical context, the command of Art. I, Section 2, that
Representatives be chosen 'by the people of the several States' means
that as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's."'143
In support of its holding, the Court looked to the records of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787.144 The Court stated that "one
principle was uppermost in the minds of many delegates: that, no
matter where he lived, each voter should have a voice equal to that of
every other in electing members of Congress."1 45 For example, James
Madison said "[i]f the power is not immediately derived from the
people, in proportion to their numbers, we may make a paper
confederacy, but that will be all."146 James Wilson stated that "equal
numbers of people ought to have an equal number of
138. 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1962).
139. Id.
140. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 7-8.
144. Id. at 7-17.
145. Id. at 10.
146. Id.
200x] 1955
VANDERBIL T LAW REVIEW
representatives"'14 7 and that representatives "of different districts
ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their
respective constituents hold to each other."'148 Edmund Randolph's
proposal for a periodic census was adopted to ensure "fair
representation of the people," an idea endorsed by George Mason as
assuring that "numbers of inhabitants" should always be the measure
of representation in the House of Representatives. 149 In addition, the
Court pointed to James Wilson's statement that "[a]ll elections ought
to be equal. Elections are equal, when a given number of citizens, in
one part of the state, choose as many representatives, as are chosen by
the same number of citizens, in any other part of the state. In this
manner, the proportion of the representatives and of the constituents
will remain invariably the same."1 50 All of this, the Court stated, adds
up to "one person, one vote."151
Justice Harlan's dissent, however, took a different view of the
historical context and argued that only action by the Georgia
legislature or Congress could offer plaintiffs the relief they sought.
15 2
Justice Harlan correctly noted that the quotations used by the
majority "were focused on the problem of how representation should
be apportioned among the States in the House of Representatives,"
and that there "is nothing which suggests even remotely that the
delegates had in mind the problem of districting within a State."
153
Justice Harlan wrote that while there was "unanimous silence" on
apportionment within the States at the Constitutional Convention,
there are repeated references to this issue in the ratifying
conventions. 1
54
As applied to the mid-decade redistricting situation, Justice
Harlan's view of the historical context of Article I is largely accurate,
while the majority's view is misguided. Justice Harlan's dissent is
faithful to the historical context for three reasons. First, he correctly
noted that the debates over redistricting at the Constitutional
147. Id. at 10-11 (citing 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 472 (Farrand
ed. 1911)).
148. Id. (citing 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 180 (Farrand ed.
1911)).
149. Id. at 13-14.
150. Id. at 17.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 24 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]n short, in the absence of
legislation providing for equal districts by the Georgia Legislature or by Congress, these
appellants have no right to the judicial relief which they seek").
153. Id. at 31-32.
154. Id. at 34.
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Convention centered on redistricting among the states, and not
redistricting within the states. The majority's reliance on quotations
concerning redistricting among different states simply is not helpful in
the present context-mid-decade redistricting exclusively involves
redistricting borders within the states. Second, the quotations relied
upon by the majority are quantitative in nature and are used to
advance the principle of one man, one vote. Again, these are not
applicable to mid-decade redistricting. The interest here is not
quantitative allocation of voters within districts, which the majority's
discussion of the historical context addressed, but rather the
qualitative differences between redistricting among the states and
within them, which the dissenting opinion accurately captured.
Finally, the dissenting opinion is much more helpful in
understanding mid-decade redistricting because it makes use of the
debates at the state ratifying conventions and the Federalist Papers.
These sources, which the majority did not examine, both strongly
support the argument that Article I does not limit a state's ability to
redistrict mid-decade. Since Justice Harlan's dissent is far more
relevant than the majority opinion to the mid-decade redistricting
scenario, this Note will now turn to a closer examination of his
dissent, the state ratifying debates, and the Federalist Papers.
At the Virginia convention, James Madison made it clear that
Article I, Section 4 applied to redistricting within a state. 15 5 Madison
said:
Should the people of any state by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was
judged proper that it should be remedied by the general government. It was found
impossible to fix the time, place, and manner, of the election of representatives, in the
Constitution. It was found necessary to leave the regulation of these, in the first place, to
the state governments, as being best acquainted with the situation of the people, subject to
the control of the general government, in order to enable it to produce uniformity, and
prevent its own dissolution. 
1 5 6
Madison's statement makes clear that while the Constitutional
Convention may have been silent on redistricting within a state, the
United States Constitution was not to interfere with the ability of a
state to set its own election and redistricting procedures.
Justice Harlan elaborated on Madison's position, writing that
the Framers thought that the power to make particular election
regulations should be submitted to the states, while the power to
create the general framework should be given to the federal
155. See id. at 37-38 (stating that "[i]n the Virginia Convention, during the discussion of
s[ection] 4, Madison . . . stated unequivocally that he looked solely to that section to prevent
unequal districting").
156. Id. (emphasis added by Justice Harlan).
200x] 1957
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
government. 157 Had the regulations been exclusively under the control
of state governments, then the federal government might easily be
dissolved. 158 However, so long as states were aware of the prospect
that the federal government could use its supervisory power to
regulate state elections, there was no need to worry about the
dissolution of the national government. 59 Implicit in the argument
fearing state action is that until the federal government chooses to
regulate state elections, there is nothing in the Constitution that
prevents mid-decade redistricting. Article I, Section 4 was intended to
regulate abuses of state election procedures by providing for
congressional supervisory power, but it was never intended to limit
states in any way. As this Note will argue later, the use of mid-decade
redistricting is precisely the kind of event that should trigger
congressional intervention under Article I, Section 4. But there is
nothing in the Constitution itself that prevents such a use of state
redistricting power.
In discussing Article I, Section 4 at the Massachusetts ratifying
convention, Mr. Parsons stated: "Indeed, if the Congress could never
agree on any regulations, then certainly no objection to the 4 th section
can remain; for the regulations introduced by the state legislatures will
be the governing rule of elections, until Congress can agree upon
alterations.'" 1 60 Parson's statement shows that while the United States
Constitution preserves the right for Congress to make laws regulating
redistricting, there is nothing in the Constitution itself that prevents
states from making their own redistricting choices.
The New York Convention also offered evidence that the
Framers did not intend the Constitution to regulate apportionment
within the states. During a debate about the use of elections at large,
Mr. Jones noted that the constitutional proposal "was not intended to
impose a requirement on the other states," but to "enable the states to
act their discretion, without the control of Congress."1 61 The New York
Convention passed a resolution stating that "nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to prevent the legislature of any state
to pass laws, from time to time, to divide such state into as many




160. Id. at 36 (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 37.
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for Congress."16 2 This statement explicitly shows not only that
redistricting within a state is not a concern regulated by the
Constitution, but also that absolutely no limit was placed on the
amount of times redistricting could occur within a state after each
decennial census.
Finally, the Pennsylvania ratifying convention expressed
similar views. At the convention, James Wilson described Article I,
Section 4 as "placing into the hands of the state legislatures" the
power to regulate elections and retaining for Congress the ability to
use "self-preserving power" to make regulations lest "the general
government.., lie prostrate at the mercy of the legislatures of the
several states. ' 16 3 Again, the statement shows that so long as
Congress chooses not to interfere in state election and redistricting
procedures, the exercise of those powers belongs to the states. There is
no mention in the state convention records suggesting that the
Constitution itself limits the ability of states to redistrict, and since
Congress has never used its supervisory power to prevent mid-decade
redistricting, the views of the Framers must be followed.
An examination of the Federalist Papers also shows that the
Framers intended to make the power to redistrict within a state the
exclusive province of the states, barring congressional action. In the
Federalist, No. 54, Madison pointed out the "fundamental cleavage"
that Article I made between apportionment of representatives among
the states and the selection and districting of representatives within
each state:
16 4
It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate number
of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule
founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted
number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants, as the State itself
may designate. 
16 5
162. Id. (emphasis added) (citing II ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 329
(2d ed. 1836))
163. Id. at 39-40.
164. See id. (stating that "[in No. 54, [Madison] discussed the inclusion of slaves in the basis
of apportionment. He said: 'It is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth
and taxation, as they are the only proper scale of representation. This statement was offered
simply to show that the slave population could not reasonably be included in the basis of
apportionment of direct taxes and excluded from the basis of apportionment of representation.
Further on in the same number of the Federalist, Madison pointed out the fundamental cleavage
which Article I made between apportionment of Representatives among the States and the
selection of Representatives within each State ....").




So while each state is required to provide districts for the
assigned number of representatives, both the procedures used for that
process as well as the qualifications of the state's voters are not
constrained by the Constitution.
The most extensive and persuasive discussion of Article I,
Section 4 was given by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 59:
It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been framed and inserted into the
Constitution, which would have been always applicable to every probable change in the
situation of the country; and it will therefore not be denied, that a discretionary power
over elections ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as readily conceded, that
there were only three ways, in which this power could have been reasonably organized;
that it must either have been lodged wholly in the National Legislature, or wholly in the
State Legislatures, or primarily in the latter, and ultimately in the former. The last
mode has, with reason, been preferred by the Convention. They have submitted the
regulation of elections for the Federal Government, in the first instance, to the local
administrations; which in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, may be
both more convenient and more satisfactory; but they have reserved to the National
authority a right to interpose, whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that
interposition necessary to its safety. 
16 6
For the sake of convenience the regulation of election law was
given exclusively to the states-only congressional intervention could
impose limitations on the ability of the states to regulate their
redistricting and election procedures. While mid-decade redistricting
may be one of those "extraordinary circumstances" of which Hamilton
spoke, there has not yet been congressional intervention preventing it,
and so the ability to redistrict within its own borders remains the
province of each and every state.
As Justice Harlan recognized, the discussion of the regulation
of federal elections found in the state ratifying conventions and the
Federalist Papers "unequivocally stated that the state legislatures
have plenary power over the conduct of congressional elections subject
only to such regulations as Congress itself might provide." 16 7 In
conclusion, the constitutional scheme vests in the states plenary
power to regulate the conduct of and election procedures for their
representatives, and in order to protect the federal government,
provides for congressional supervision of the states' exercise of that
power. 168 Since Congress has not exercised its power in an effort to
ban mid-decade redistricting, states must be allowed to engage in this
practice if they choose to do so.
166. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 325-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 2002)
(emphasis added).
167. Sanders, 376 U.S. at 41 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 42.
1960 [Vol. 57:5:1935
DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE
V. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS: MID-DECADE REDISTRICTING AS A
PARTISAN GERRYMANDER
Mid-decade redistricting is a particular type of partisan
gerrymander, designed to benefit the political party that most recently
received unified control of the state government. These types of
gerrymanders are particularly difficult to challenge: the Supreme
Court's test for striking down maps resulting from partisan
gerrymanders is nearly insurmountable. 169 While this case law was
developed by claims against redistricting maps enacted immediately
after a census, mid-decade redistricting is simply a particular type of
partisan gerrymander, and thus the reasoning of this precedent
weighs heavily against the overturning of a map created mid-decade.
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court considered whether
a redistricting map governing elections in the Indiana House of
Representatives constituted a political gerrymander intended to
disadvantage Democrats across the state. 170 Democrats argued that
the map, which was drawn by the Republican-controlled legislature
following the 1980 census, was intended to and did violate their right,
as members of the Democratic Party, to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 171 A four-Justice plurality laid down a test
requiring plaintiffs to prove "both intentional discrimination against a
politically identifiable group and an actual discriminatory effect on
that group."'172  The Court noted that "politics and political
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment,"
and that "[tihe reality is that districting inevitably has and is
169. See Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1196, 1207 (2004) (discussing the stringent tests and high standards of proof lower federal
courts have adopted in order for a plaintiff to succeed in bringing a partisan gerrymandering
claim). Although some Justices sought to reject these stringent criteria, the criteria are currently
still in effect because a majority of the court could not agree on a standard to assess political
gerrymandering claims. See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2004) (holding that
"[elighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for it justify us in revisiting the
question whether the standard promised by Bandemer exists. As the following discussion
reveals, no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political
gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.").
170. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
171. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115 (explaining that "[i]n early 1982, this suit was filed by
several Indiana Democrats (here the appellees) against various state officials (here the
appellants), alleging that the 1981 reapportionment plans constituted a political gerrymander
intended to disadvantage Democrats. Specifically, they contended that the particular district
lines that were drawn and the mix of single-member and multimember districts were intended to
and did violate their right, as Democrats, to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
172. Id. at 127.
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intended to have substantial political consequences."'173 Consequently,
the "intentional discrimination" prong of the test is nearly always
satisfied: "as long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should
not be very difficult to prove that the likely political consequences of
the reapportionment were intended." 174
The "actual discriminatory effect" prong of the test, however, is
much more difficult to satisfy. The Court explained that "the mere
lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove
unconstitutional discrimination."' 175 Overt political considerations and
lack of proportionality are not enough to strike down a map - "only
when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the
political process as a whole" will a redistricting map be declared
unconstitutional. 176 Such a finding of degradation "must be supported
by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the
voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to
influence the political process." 177
The Court wrote that the inability to influence the political
process could not be proven by relying on the results of a single
election. 178 A single year's election results are insufficient because
they fail to show, on their own, that a political party could not secure a
sufficient share of the vote to take control of the legislature in one of
the next few elections. 179 Furthermore, there can be no Equal
Protection violation unless there is a finding that the redistricting
map would consign a political party to minority status in the
legislature for the entire decade or that the political party would have
"no hope of doing any better in the reapportionment that would occur"
after the next census. °80 In short, simply showing that districts are
"constructed so as to be safely Republican or Democratic in no way
bolsters the contention that there has been statewide discrimination"
against voters of a political party.181
Bandemer's holding on state legislative redistricting was
extended to congressional redistricting by a federal district court in
173. Id. at 128-29.
174. Id. at 129.
175. Id. at 132. In this case, the lack of proportional representation involved Democrats
winning far fewer House seats than their statewide percentage of the vote would have suggested.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 133.
178. Id. at 135.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 135-36.
181. Id. at 136 (emphasis removed).
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Badham v. Eu.18 2 Since the redistricting map in Badham was created
by the legislature, the discriminatory intent prong was automatically
satisfied, and the district court looked only to the sufficiency of the
alleged discriminatory effects of the redistricting plan. 8 3 Plaintiffs
failed to meet this standard because there was no evidence that
Republicans were "shut out" of the political process and nothing to
suggest that "anyone has ever interfered with Republican registration,
organizing, voting, fund-raising, or campaigning."'1 4 The court also
pointed to the fact that California Republicans still held 40 percent of
the state's congressional seats, "a sizeable block that is far more than
mere token representation."'' 8 5 Finally, the court noted that it was
impossible to argue that Republicans were shut out of the political
process after they were successful in overturning the redistricting bill
by a voter referendum. 186 This ruling was summarily affirmed by the
Supreme Court, and lower courts have adopted the holding to decide
partisan gerrymandering claims.
8 7
Supreme Court precedent on partisan gerrymandering strongly
supports the allowance of mid-decade redistricting under the Equal
Protection Clause. While the aforementioned cases dealt with
redistricting plans enacted following the results of a census, it is likely
that mid-decade redistricting, a particular type of partisan
gerrymander, will be held to the same test articulated in Bandemer
and extended in Badham. Under this test, it is highly unlikely that
mid-decade redistricting could be held unconstitutional. Like the
situation in Bandemer and Badham, mid-decade redistricting occurs
as a result of legislative action, and thus there will never be a problem
satisfying the "discriminatory intent" prong of the test. An application
of the factors employed under the "discriminatory effect" prong,
182. 694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd mem., 488 U.S. 1024. The facts in this case are
almost identical to those in Bandemer. Following the 1980 census, the Democratic-controlled
legislature passed a redistricting map that disadvantaged Republicans. Id. at 666. The
Republican Party initiated a voter referendum to prevent the use of the redistricting map, which
the voters passed. Id. The California Supreme Court, however, ordered the challenged map to be
used in the elections because it was the only practical alternative. Id. A special session of the
legislature later affirmed the use of the redistricting plan, and several Republican congressmen
sued, giving rise to the action in Badham. Id.
183. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 670.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 672.
186. Id.
187. See Note, supra note 169, at 1207 (stating that "[t]he Badham test, under which a major
party must prove that it has effectively been shut out of the entire political process, has since
become the law that lower courts have applied to partisan gerrymandering claims.").
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however, shows that mid-decade redistricting is likely to be held
constitutional.
The Supreme Court's unequivocal assertion that the lack of
proportionality between a political party's share of the statewide vote
and their percentage of House seats can never alone be enough to
declare a partisan gerrymander unconstitutional makes it difficult to
invalidate mid-decade redistricting. 8 8 As a consequence of this
requirement, even large shifts in a congressional delegation, as was
the case in Texas in 2004, cannot render a redistricting map
unconstitutional. This belief was underscored in Badham, where the
court suggested that so long as a political party does not have "token
representation" in a congressional delegation, there can never be an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. l8 9
In addition, it will be extremely difficult for a political party to
show that it was entirely "shut out" of the political process, which was
one of the driving factors in the Badham decision.190 For example, the
situation in Texas clearly fails this test. Despite complete Republican
control of the Texas legislature, Democrats successfully used
parliamentary tactics to defeat two special sessions called to create a
new map.' 9' This sort of political power, just like the referendum
passed in Badham, is hardly representative of a group that holds no
political power and is shut out of the political process. Furthermore,
parliamentary tactics (though never as extreme as the fleeing of the
state that occurred in Texas) may be used routinely in state
legislatures across the country to influence, frustrate, and defeat the
redistricting process. These available procedures make it very
difficult, if not impossible, for a political party to claim that a
redistricting map must be declared unconstitutional because it has
been completely shut out of the political process. Finally, the Badham
court stressed the importance of the availability of voter registration,
organizing, voting, fundraising, and campaigning.192 Mid-decade
188. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (stating that "[als with individual
districts, where unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of statewide political
gerrymandering, the mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove
unconstitutional discrimination. Again, without specific supporting evidence, a court cannot
presume in such a case that those who are elected will disregard the disproportionately
underrepresented group. Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters'
influence on the political process as a whole.").
189. Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672.
190. Id. at 670.
191. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
192. See id. ("Specifically, there are no factual allegations regarding California Republicans'
role in "the political process as a whole. There are no allegations that California Republicans
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redistricting generally does not affect these activities, and thus such
plans still leave the opportunity for a political party to fully
participate in public debate.
The Supreme Court's requirement that the results of more
than one election be used to support a claim against a partisan
gerrymander offers the best hope of declaring mid-decade redistricting
unconstitutional, but even these challenges likely will fail in all but
the most egregious abuses of mid-decade redistricting.1 93 When a
legislature engages in mid-decade redistricting, it almost certainly will
result in disproportionate representation, with the minority party in
the legislature losing more congressional seats than the statewide
balance of power would suggest. 194 Mid-decade redistricting will offer
a court at least one more look at election returns under a different
congressional map, and the more frequently a state engages in mid-
decade redistricting, the more evidence a court will have to weigh in
determining its constitutionality. The problem is that while frequent
mid-decade redistricting is likely to offer repeated evidence of
disproportionality, it does not address the Supreme Court's statement
that a political party must have no hope of doing any better following
the next census. 195 In short, while frequent mid-decade redistricting
may offer retrospective evidence of discriminatory effects, it does
nothing in itself to satisfy the court's inquiry into prospective
discriminatory effects.
have been 'shut out' of the political process, nor are there allegations that anyone has ever
interfered with Republican registration, organizing, voting, fund-raising, or campaigning.
Republicans remain free to speak out on issues of public concern; plaintiffs do not allege that
there are, or have ever been, any impediments to their full participation in the 'uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open' public debate on which our political system relies.") (citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
193. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132-133 (stating that the only scenario where a complaining
party can prevail is one in which it has been "unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively
influence the political process.").
194. This hypothesis has yet to be tested, as the Texas redistricting plan was enacted to
correct a pre-existing disproportionality, not to create one. But the enormous success of Texas'
redistricting plan in the 2004 elections only underscores the ability of a newfound majority to
create dramatic swings in the political party representation of a state's congressional delegation.
195. Id. at 135-36.
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VI. THE SOLUTION: CONGRESS SHOULD EXERCISE ITS SUPERVISORY
POWER TO PREVENT MID-DECADE REDISTRICTING BECAUSE IT
FUNDAMENTALLY VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY
The United States Constitution is silent on the use of mid-
decade redistricting. As this Note has shown, unless Congress decides
to use its supervisory power to enact a law regulating mid-decade
redistricting, the states are required to redistrict immediately after
the census, and most likely will be free to redistrict again whenever
they so choose. Congress has not used its supervisory power in this
area, and consequently states such as Texas have not been limited in
the amount of times they can redistrict. While there is currently no
barrier to mid-decade redistricting, the use of this practice is
fundamentally against public policy. This Note proposes that Congress
exercise its supervisory power to enact a statute prohibiting mid-
decade redistricting and limiting the ability of states to redistrict only
after the release of the decennial census.
The Framers of the Unites States Constitution sought to make
the House of Representatives both representative of and accountable
to the people. 196 The House of Representatives was the only federal
institution created to be directly accountable to the people, since the
President and Vice President were to be elected indirectly by the
Electoral College for four-year terms, senators were to be chosen by
state legislatures for six-year terms, and federal judges were to be
appointed for life. 197 True representation was to be achieved through
reapportioning congressional seats among the states every ten years
based on a decennial census of the population. 198 Accountability was to
be achieved by requiring an election every two years "by the People" of
196. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 821 (1995) (stating that "the
Framers, in perhaps their most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Government
directly responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly,
not by States, but by the people."); see also Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 528 (2001) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (noting that "Representatives in the National Government are responsible to the
people who elect them, not to the States in which they reside .... The idea of federalism is that a
National Legislature enacts laws which bind the people as individuals, not as citizens of a State;
and, it follows, freedom is most secure if the people themselves, not the States as intermediaries,
hold their federal legislators to account for the conduct of their office.").
197. See Note, supra note 169, at 1199 (stating that "[t]he institution that the Framers
chose to truly represent 'the People' was, as its name suggests, the House of Representatives.
Under the Great Compromise, which resolved the controversy over representation that had
impeded formation of the Union, the Senate would represent the states, while the House of
Representatives would represent the people. Indeed, the House of Representatives was the only
national institution in the constitutional framework designed to be directly accountable to the
people.").
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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each of the states. 199 At the Constitutional Convention, George Mason
of Virginia explained that the vision of the House of Representatives
was to make it "the grand depository of the democratic principle of the
Gov[ernmen]t. ''200  The Framers intended the House of
Representatives to "have an immediate dependence upon, and
sympathy with the people. ' 20 1 Unlike its Senate counterpart, the
House should come directly from the American people and "guard
their interests, support their rights, express their opinions, make
known their wants, redress their grievances, and introduce a
pervading popular influence throughout all the operations of the
government. '20 2 In order to realize this goal, representatives must be
tied to the people directly and made accountable to them. Justice
Story wrote that a "fundamental axiom of republican governments" is
that there must be "a dependence on, and a responsibility to, the
people, on the part of the representative, which shall constantly exert
an influence upon his acts and opinions, and produce a sympathy
between him and his constituents."20 3
The Framers of the Constitution recognized that the only true
way to achieve accountability was to provide for stability in
representation. At the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
stated that "[i]nstability is one of the great vices of our republics, to be
remedied."20 4 While instability was an evil that the Framers sought to
curb, the goal of equal representation required that the distribution of
congressional seats be altered as the populations of states shifted and
grew. Ultimately, the fundamental tension between stability and
equal representation led the Framers to adopt a decennial census
that is used both as a method for apportioning seats among the states
and as a calendar for determining when to apportion the seats.20 5
The best way of satisfying the Framers' goal of limiting
instability and maximizing accountability is to limit redistricting to
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
200. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (citing 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 48 (Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
201. JOSEPH STORY, STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 291 (1833) [hereinafter
STORY'S COMMENTARIES].
202. Id.
203. People ex rel Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1242 (Colo. 2003) (Kourlis, J.,
dissenting) (citing STORY'S COMMENTARIES at § 300).
204. Id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (citing I 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 212
(Wilbourne E. Benton ed., 1986) (notes of Mr. Madison)).
205. See id. (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tihis fundamental tension between
stability and equal representation led the Framers to require ten years between apportionments.




once every ten years. While mid-decade redistricting has only occurred
twice so far, several other states have threatened to engage in mid-
decade redistricting. By all appearances, the use (or at least the
threat) of this new tactic is likely to increase in the future. If
congressional districts were to change at the whim of state
legislatures, members of Congress could often find their constituents
voting in a different district in subsequent elections. In this situation,
"a congressperson would be torn between effectively representing the
current constituents and currying the favor of the future
constituents."20 6 If a congressman knows that his district will be
moved, then there is very little incentive for him to actively represent
the people in the original district, who elected him to the House. In
order to get reelected, he likely will have to spend time with residents
of the new congressional district and make sure that his votes are in
line with their interests. Consequently, the voters in the original
district most likely will be left with less than effective representation.
Continuous redistricting based on changing partisan control of
state governments inherently disrupts the links between incumbent
representatives and their constituents, and much dicta can be found in
Supreme Court opinions emphasizing the importance of the bond
between a member of Congress and his constituents. In White v.
Weiser, the Court applauded the use of a state's good faith effort to
"maintain existing relationships between incumbent congressmen and
their constituents."20 7 Similarly, the Court in Bush v. Vera noted that
the maintenance of the unique relationship between a member of
Congress and his constituents is a "legitimate state goal" and a
"traditional [redistricting] principle."208 In both these cases, the
Supreme Court unmistakably noted the importance of the bond
between members of Congress and their constituents. Yet
circumventing this goal was clearly the motivation in the Texas
redistricting saga. The map passed by the Republican Party was
specifically designed to cut the links between incumbent
representatives and their constituents. The central strategy for that
goal was breaking up districts where Republican-leaning voters had
very strong relationships with long-standing Democratic incumbents,
thereby destroying the congressman-constituent bond and
undermining accountability. 209 Congressional silence is likely to allow
such redistricting to continue, and this practice will lead to a
206. Id. at 1242.
207. 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973).
208. 517 U.S. 952, 964-65 (1996).
209. Motion to Prohibit at 23, Balderas (6:01-CV-158).
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breakdown of the congressional-constituent bond in many
congressional districts across the country.
If members of Congress do not represent the same voters until
the next census, accountability could be undermined. When the states
manipulate district boundaries to determine which incumbents will be
reelected and which will be defeated, it prevents the people from
making that decision.210 Instead of owing their election to the people,
as the Framers of the Constitution intended, congressmen will owe
their elections to the mercy of the state legislatures. 211 The Texas
redistricting case offers a good example. Before the redistricting,
several Democrats were reelected in moderately Republican-leaning
districts. By engaging in mid-decade redistricting, the mapmakers
targeted several of these members and crafted their new districts to be
heavily Republican. 212 This action effectively doomed those members
of Congress to defeat, whereas they probably would have won
reelection if the mid-decade redistricting had not occurred. One could
argue that the voters in the newly-created, heavily Republican
districts are still making the decision, but realistically, there is only a
certain amount of cross-over voting that occurs. If a congressional
district has a heavy enough partisan edge in voter registration, it is
nearly impossible for the minority party in that district to win it.213
As a result, while the voters themselves would be likely to reelect the
incumbent, by placing the incumbent in an district impossible to win,
the leaders of the majority party make a decision that effectively
ensures the incumbent is defeated regardless of the level of voter
satisfaction with him.
210. Id. at 20.
211. See Note, supra note 169, at 1202 (arguing that "[a]lthough it might be hyperbolic to
claim, as Hamilton did, that the very 'existence of the Union' is subject to the whims of state
legislatures, ample evidence demonstrates that many of today's congressional representatives
owe their election not to 'the People of the several states' but to the mercy of state legislatures.
With increasingly sophisticated redistricting technology, today's state legislators have even
greater opportunities to 'pack,' 'crack,' and 'kidnap' voters in congressional elections.").
212. A party's voting strength effectively can be destroyed in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Sam
Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of
Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 194 (2003) (noting that "[a] group's voting
strength can be diluted either by over-concentrating, or 'packing,' its members into the fewest
possible districts and thus effectively wasting votes that might have had a meaningful impact in
neighboring districts, or by fragmenting, or 'cracking' concentrations of the group's members and
dispersing them into two or more districts where they will constitute an ineffective minority of
the electorate.").
213. The 2004 congressional elections in Texas provide a good example. Despite being well-
known and well-liked, every targeted Democratic incumbent except for one was defeated in their
new, overwhelmingly Republican districts. See supra note 52.
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Even without mid-decade redistricting, congressional elections
are becoming remarkably uncompetitive, thus eliminating the voices
of millions of voters.214 For example, in the 2002 congressional
elections, only four challengers defeated incumbents, more than 80
percent of House members won reelection in landslide victories
(garnering at least 60 percent of the vote), and in eighty districts one
of the two major parties declined even to field a candidate.215 The
uncompetitive nature of congressional elections is greatly exacerbated
when a political party engages in mid-decade redistricting, because it
almost automatically defeats members of the opposite party and
ensures the election of members of the controlling party. By limiting
redistricting to once every ten years, the uncompetitive nature of
congressional elections can be diluted over time. But when a political
party has complete control over the redistricting process and can use
it repeatedly, congressional elections will become increasingly
predictable. 216 By effectively eliminating competitive congressional
elections, mid-decade redistricting will silence the voices and thwart
the will of millions of voters.
Mid-decade redistricting also may reduce the quality of
representation as a whole. By cutting the link between incumbent
members of Congress and their constituents, elections would place the
incumbent representative before voters whom he had never before
represented. A member of Congress who had served his constituents
well could be knocked out of office if his district is shifted to an
overwhelmingly new set of voters, while an ineffective member of
Congress who belongs to the party in power could be saved by
removing from his district his most dissatisfied constituents.217
Moreover, the quality of the incumbent congressmen that are moved
214. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
215. See Note, supra note 169, at 1202-03.
216. The 2002 elections left little doubt that the partisan control of the redistricting process
affects who gets elected to Congress. For a detailed explanation of redistricting's impact on the
2002 elections, see id. at 1203 (citing Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives:
What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 198,
200 (2003)). Statistics show that in the fourteen states where Republicans had complete control
over the redistricting process, Republicans captured 67 percent of the House seats in 2002, even
though George Bush received only 51 percent of the vote in these states in 2000. Id. Similarly, in
the nine states where Democrats had complete control over redistricting, Democrats won 57
percent of the House seats in 2002 even though Al Gore received only 51 percent of the vote in
these states in 2000. Id. In sharp contrast, in the twenty-seven states where neither party had
unilateral control over redistricting, the distribution was split exactly down the middle - with
each party winning 50 percent of the House seats in 2002, and Gore and Bush each earning 50
percent of the votes in these states in 2000. Id.
217. Motion to Prohibit at 22, Balderas (6:01-CV-158).
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into overwhelmingly unfavorable districts is likely to be high.218 These
incumbents are routinely targeted because of their cross-over appeal
and their ability to win votes from members of the opposite party. In
order to win in a district where voter registration numbers are against
the incumbent,219  the incumbent must provide high quality
representation and constituent services. When these members of
Congress are effectively removed from office by being drawn into a
district with a heavily partisan disadvantage, the state loses a high
quality representative.
History shows that mid-decade redistricting is virtually
unheard of in the modern era; in fact, Texas and Colorado are the only
states to have done so, although other states will no doubt follow.
220
The recent mid-decade redistrictings have occurred only in states
where a political party that lacked unilateral control over the
redistricting process in 2001 (when states are required to redistrict
after the release of the decennial census) subsequently gained
complete power in state government and sought to entrench their
power nationally by wiping out members of Congress from the
minority party. 221  This practice poses an enormous risk of
permanently entrenching the majority party in Congress by
preventing any competitive and disputed elections. If the states can
redistrict mid-decade, they can fine-tune their maps every two years
with data from the latest elections to further tweak congressional
district boundaries. 222 This practice most likely will put the minority
218. "Unfavorable" is measured by the partisan disadvantage in voter registration within
the district. "Quality" refers to congressmen who have been effective (as measured by approval
ratings) and personally popular despite being a member of a different political party than a
majority of their constituents.
219. When voter registration numbers are against the incumbent, it means that more people
in the district are registered voters of the party the incumbent does not belong to than are
registered to the incumbent's party.
220. See People ex rel Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1240 (Colo. 2003) (Kourlis, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[d]espite the differences in state approaches to congressional
redistricting, we have found no decision by any state's highest court that has interpreted its
constitution to allow redistricting more than once per decade. To the contrary, many have
concluded that congressional redistricting may only occur once per census period.").
221. Motion to Prohibit at 23, Balderas (6:01-CV-158). New technology has made tweaking
congressional boundaries remarkably easy to perform. See, e.g., Caliper Corporation, Maptitude®
for Redistricting: State Edition, available at http://www.caliper.comfRedistricting/state_
edition.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004) (describing redistricting software that includes
"nationwide geographic data sets including streets with address information, and states,
counties, census tracts, and other census boundaries with over 600 demographic variables" and
allows users to "[a]dd areas to a target district ... by pointing, by dragging a circle, by defining
the corners of a polygon (lassoing), and by attribute values.").
222. Motion to Prohibit at 6, Balderas (6:01-CV-158).
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party at a near crippling disadvantage and may end competitive
elections within an entire state.
In addition to these public policy concerns, mid-decade
redistricting also undermines the balance of federalism. 223 When a
state engages in mid-decade redistricting, the state legislature asserts
a power over the composition of the national legislature, and
unnecessarily interposes itself between the people and Congress. 224 In
other words, not only is there an injury in the non-exercise of voter
choice, but there is one in the exercise of state choice as well. 225 When
a state redistricts mid-decade to skew the composition of the national
legislature by favoring candidates of its dominant political party, it
reflects not the citizen's preferences, but the state legislature's. 2
26
VII. CONCLUSION
The political and public policy considerations discussed in this
Note unmistakably show that mid-decade redistricting presents an
affront to the democratic process. Mid-decade redistricting eviscerates
the Framers' goals of making the House of Representatives both
accountable to and representative of the people. Pursuing redistricting
more than once per decade breaks the bond between a representative
and his constituents. In addition, the quality of overall representation
is likely to decline since it is the congressmen who are most popular
and best able to achieve cross-over appeal who will be targeted.
Finally, mid-decade redistricting has the potential to end competitive
elections. The party in power will have the ability to entrench itself
further, election after election, thus leading to the near demise of the
minority party within the state, and establishing one-party control
over the state's congressional delegation. For these reasons, it is
essential for Congress to exercise its supervisory power to enact
legislation preventing the use of mid-decade redistricting. Both Article
I of the United States Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment will allow states to continue this practice
223. See Note, supra note 169, at 1197 (arguing that "the real injury of partisan
gerrymandering is its upset of the balance of federalism: through redistricting, state legislatures
have essentially replevied the power they once had to choose their respective states' delegates to
the national government.").
224. Id. at 1204, 1209.
225. See id. at 1211 (stating that "states are not exercising any meaningful authority of their
own in redistricting, but are simply the pawns of congressional leaders.").
226. See id. (concluding that "[sitates are skewing the composition of the national legislature




until Congress ends its silence. Should Congress fail to do so, there is
a serious risk that elections in many states will become mere
formalities, and that the people of these states will receive subpar
representation. While the Framers of the Constitution were silent on
the issue of mid-decade redistricting, the practice is antithetical to
their vision of good government. Congress must step forward to
prevent the decaying of our political process and ensure that the
Framers' vision of democracy be maintained.
Patrick Marecki*
* Many thanks to all those who have helped edit this Note, particularly Tom
Rivers and Mary DeYoung.
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